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Separation of Powers in Municipal Government:
Division of Executive and Legislative Authority
The separation of powers doctrine has traditionally been considered to be virtually irrelevant to the functioning of local government. In recent decades, however, municipal government has
evolved dramatically as the increasingly popular home rule provisions in state constitutions have allowed cities to draft their own
charters1and state legislatures have authorized a wide variety of
optional governmental forms.' A dominant feature in many of
these new forms is the strengthened position of local executive
power. In accordance with this trend, a few courts have recently
recognized that the separation of powers doctrine applies in the
context of municipal government disputes.' In the case of
Martindale v. Anderson4 the Supreme Court of Utah carried this
trend to its ultimate conclusion: the complete separation of executive and legislative powers with a blanket grant of executive
power to the mayor.
This Comment will provide an overview of the judicial recognition of the separation of municipal executive and legislative
powers. It will then focus on the Martindale decision and examine
the theoretical implications of reallocating municipal powers.
This Comment will then consider the practical consequences of
distributing functions according to the executive-legislative distinction and, finally, will suggest some possible mechanisms for
checking potential abuse of executive power in a municipal separation of powers system.

A. Traditional View
Courts traditionally have declared that the doctrine of separation of governmental powers is inapplicable at the local level.
1. E.g., CAL.CONST.art. XI, 00 3-6; ILL.CONST.art. W, 5 6; M m . CONST.
ireVII,

9 22.

2. E.g., N.J. STAT.ANN.48 40:69A-1 to -210 (West 1967); OKLA.STAT.ANN.tit. 11,
$0 9-101 to 12-114 ( W e ~ t1978).
3. Kennedy v. Ross, 28 Cal. 2d 569, 170 P.2d 904 (1946);Municipal Court v. Patrick,
254 So. 2d 193 (Fla. 1971); Bmidrick v. Lindsay, 39 N.Y.2d 641, 350 N.E.2d 595, 385

N.Y.S.2d 265 (1976).
4. 581 P.2d 1022 (Utah 1978).

962

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[I978

In 1868, for example, the California Supreme Court in People v.
Provines" held the state constitutional requirement that government be divided into separate branches did not apply to municip a l i t i e ~The
. ~ legal rationale was that, since the state constitution
itself did not create local governments (a function left up to the
state legislature), the constitutional separation of powers requirement did not apply to ~ i t i e sThe
. ~ policy rationale was that separation of powers serves to prevent the abuses which might arise
from an unchecked concentration of power.n The court reasoned
that since a municipality was the creature of a superior government, the superior government provided a sufficient check on
potential abuse a t the lower level.'
In 1942, the New York Court of Appeals rejected Mayor LaGuardia's argument in LaGuardia v. Smithlo that New York
City's government was patterned after the federal model, with
independent, coordinate branches, and denied the mayor's claim
of executive immunity from a subpoena duces tecum issued by
the city c ~ u n c i l As
. ~ ~recently as 1973 the New Jersey Supreme

5. 34 Cal. 520 (1868).
6. "In short," the court held, "the Third Article of the Constitution means that the
powers of the State Government, not the local governments thereafter to be created by
the Legislature, shall he divided into three departments . . . ." Id. at 534. See also Santo
v. State, 2 Iowa 165, 220 (1856).
7. 34 Cal. at 534.
8. The recent appearance of the separation of powers doctrine in local government
seems to be based largely on a different rationale-the need for increased efficiency. See
Jackson v. Inman, 232 Ga. 566, 569,207 S.E.2d 475,478 (1974).In spite of the inefficiency
inherent in a government with separated powers, this form of government may be more
efficient than the traditional municipal forms since the power to make executive decisions
normally resides in a single individual rather than in a group of individuals.
9. 34 Cal. at 537. The court explained:
The mischief, however, against which [the framers of the federal and state
constitutionsl sought to provide, did not come from inferior or subordinate
officers, but from the higher grades, in whose hands the first and leading powers
of the Government were vested. So far as the former were concerned, they were
sufficiently under the control of the latter. Abuse of power could not come from
the former in such measure as to destroy or overthrow the liberties of the people,
except by direction or connivance of the latter. To surround the latter with
checks was a sufficient protection against the former.
Id.
10. 288 N.Y. 1, 41 N.E.2d 153 (1942).
11. A special investigative committee of the city council had sought a written report
in the mayor's possession by serving him with a subpoena duces tecum. The mayor refused
to produce the report, claiming executive immunity. The court recognized the city charter
did prescribe some independent functions for the major and council, but noted that under
the charter the mayor also performed certain legislative functions. The court reasoned that
since the legislative and executive functions are not as well separated a t the city level as
they are a t the national level, the mayor could not invoke executive immunity. Id.
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Court rejected a claim that resolutions passed by the governing
body of a township restructuring the police department offended
the doctrine of separation of powers.12 The New Jersey court
pointed out that since the township's governing body possessed a
broad statutory grant of power, and since the authority of the
chief of police was merely derived from that governing
the
separation of powers doctrine had no application.14
This general rule that separation of powers does not apply to
municipalities means only that a separation between the executive and legislative functions of local government is not mandatory? It does not mean that such a separation is impossible?
One recent case holding that the separation of powers doctrine
did not apply in a local setting implied a state statute or municipal charter might specifically provide for the separation of powers." In practice, however, true separation of powers has been
virtually unknown a t the local level until recently.

B. Emergence of New Forms of Municipal Government
During the nineteenth century, the weak-mayor form of city
government predominated in the United States, although some
strengthening of the mayor's powers took place by the latter part
of the century? The commission form emerged early in the twentieth century, followed by the emergence of the commissionmanager or council-manager form.lg All of these forms involved
12. Smith v. Township of Hazlet, 63 N.J. 523, 309 A.2d 210 (1973).
13. Id. This case is a good example of the traditional legal status of municipal executive departments: they operate largely on power derived from the municipal legislative
body rather than directly from the state legislature.
14. Id. See Eggers v. Kenny, 15 N.J. 107, 104 A.2d 10 (1954).
15. Separation may be required between state courts and local legislative bodies.
E.g., County of Los Angeles v. Superior Court, 13 Cal. 3d 721, 532 P.2d 495, 119 Cal. Rptr.
631 (1975). This Comment deals only with the separation of local executive and legislative
functions.
16. See Dreyer v. Illinois, 187 U.S. 71 (1902) (since the manner in which a state
divides the functions of government is a matter for its own determination, a separation of
L. REV.1217,
powers infringement does not constitute a due process violation); 42 COLUM.
1218 n.9 (1942).
17. Ruggeri v. City of St. Louis, 441 S.W.2d 361, 365 (Mo. 1969).
18. Boynton, City Councils: Their Role in the Legislative System, 11976) MUNICIPAL
Y.B. 67. The weak-mayor form of municipal government is a council-mayor form "in
which the mayor and the council share a range of legislative and administrative powers."
Id. a t 67.
19. Id. The commission form of government unifies "policy-making and policyimplementing activities in a council composed of major functional department heads who
were elected to office." Id. The commission-manager or council-manager form has the
same basic structure but also utilizes a city manager who is subordinate to the council or
commission. Id.
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extensive mingling of functions, with little or no concern for the
separation of powers.
While most municipalities ultimately depend upon state
, ~ today are genergovernment as their source of a ~ t h o r i t ycities
ally granted considerable choice concerning their particular form
of government. In a majority of the states, cities have the power
(in some cases even without the approval of the state legislature)
to draft and amend home rule charter^,^' and in many states-cities
are allowed to choose from among several optional statutory
A new trend toward more divided governmental authority
has emerged as cities have increased the power and responsibility
Conof the mayor in order to improve administrative effi~iency.~"
sequently, the greatest separation of powers today is found in the
mayor-council form of municipal g o ~ e r n r n e n t and
, ~ ~ the role of
the mayor is also expanding in council-manager forms in large
cities.25

C. Increasing Judicial Recognition of the Separation
of Municipal Powers
An early indication that separation of municipal powers
might eventually be recognized appeared in the forceful 1942 dissent by Chief Justice Lehman of the New York Court of Appeals
in LaGuardia v. Smith." The Chief Justice vigorously attacked
the majority's view that the separation of powers doctrine did not
-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

p
p

20. See, e . g , Opinion of the Justices, 276 A.2d 441, 444 (Me. 1971); In re Elliot, 74
Wash. 2d 600, 604, 446 P.2d 347, 351 (1968).
LAW$8 3.00-.01, 3.05 (1978). See, e . g , CAL.
LOCALGOVERNMENT
21. 1 C. ANTIEAU,
CONST.art. XI, 88 3-6; ILL.CONST.art. VII, 8 6; MICH.CONST.art. VII, Ej 22.
22. Eg., N.J. STAT.ANN.EjEj 40:69A-1 to -210 (West 1967); OKLA.STAT.
ANN.tit. 11,
66 9-101 to 12-114 (West 1978).
23. H. HALLMAN,
G. WASHNIS,& E. CRAWFORD,
ORGANIZATIONAL
ISSUESOF CITY
GOVERNMENT
14-15 (1973); 3 MCQUILLAN
MUNICIPAL
CORPORATIONS
Ej 12.43 (3d ed. repl.
1973).
24. In 1973, the mayor-council form was used in the majority of the 32 cities with
G. WASHNIS,
& E. CRAWFORD,
supra note 23, a t 5.
populations over 400,000. H. HALLMAN,
25. Id. a t 4,15; E . LEWIS,THEURBAN
POLITICAL
SYSTEM
87-88 (1973). One study found
the mayor acts as the presiding officer of the city council or commission most often in the
commission form, next most often in the council-manager form, and least often in the
council-mayor form, concluding that "the difference reflects the extent to which some
strong mayor cities have adopted a theory of the separation of legislative and executive
powers comparable to that a t the state or national level." Boynton, supra note 18, a t 72.
The same study showed the mayor had the right to vote on all issues before the council
or commission in 82% of the cities using the commission form, 72% of those with the
council-manager form, and only 19% of those with the council-mayor form. A further
distinguishing feature of the council-mayor form is the mayoral veto. Id.
26. 288 N.Y. 1,. 8, 41 N.E.2d 153, 156 (1942) (Lehman, C.J., dissenting).
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protect the mayor from a subpoena issuing under the authority
of the city council. Where the fundamental law of any government distributes the executive, legislative, and judicial functions
among different branches, he argued, it necessarily implies that
the branches are to be kept separate and distinct.27Since the New
York City Charter was to be "construed in the light of these tried
traditions of American g o ~ e r n m e n t , "and
~ ~ since the charter conferred broad executive power on the mayor and broad legislative
power on the city council,2ghe contended it is "necessarily implied in the grant of power to each a limitation that neither . . .
may encroach upon the field reserved for the other."Whief Justice Lehman further reasoned that these areas of exclusive power
can exist even though the separation of powers is not complete:^'
and argued that in the LaGuardia case the city council had interfered in an exclusively executive realm.32
The argument that the separation of powers doctrine could
justify a mayor's assertion of an exclusive executive power was
adopted four years later by the California Supreme Court in
Kennedy v. Ross." In that case the California court upheld the
validity of a contract made by the mayor of San Francisco without the authorization of the city's board of supervisors. The court
found that the framers of the San Francisco Charter had intended
to create a "division or separation of powers,"34 depriving the
board of supervisors of all administrative functions." Similarly,
the New Jersey Supreme Court commented in 1962 that the separation of powers was the fundamental theory underlying the city
manager form of g ~ v e r n m e n t . ~ ~
While Kennedy v. Ross applied the separation of powers doctrine to recognize additional authority in the executive branch,
some more recent decisions have applied the same doctrine to cut
the other direction. In 1973, for example, the Supreme Court of
Florida used the separation of powers rationale to proscribe the
mayor's power to establish a curfew and a penalty for its viola-

27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.

Id. at 10, 41 N.E.2d at 157.
Id. at 15, 41 N.E.2d at 160.
Id. at 13, 41 N.E.2d at 159.
Id. at 12, 41 N.E.2d at 158.
Id. at 13, 41 N.E.2d at 159.
Id. at 15-16, 41 N.E.2d at 160.
28 Cal. 2d 569, 170 P.2d 904 (1946).
Id. at 576, 170 P.2d at 909.
Id. at 577, 170 P.2d at 909.
Clifton v. Zweir, 36 N.J. 309, 177 A.2d 545 (1962).
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tion." In 1976 the New York Court of Appeals recognized the
separation of executive and legislative powers in New York City
government and held that certain executive action constituted
"an impermissible exercise of legislative power vested by the New
York City Charter in the city council.""
Courts may turn to the state and federal separation of powers
models to interpret a city's governing statute or charter if the city
chooses to operate under a form of government with divided powers. When the city of Atlanta recently abandoned the strong commission form of government, the Supreme Court of Georgia took
occasion to comment, in dicta, that the city's charter h a d been
"changed drastically" to handle the growing demands of a large
urban area. The new charter, the court said, had established a
government with a "classic separation of powers.""' Once this
analogy to the state and federal systems has been made, a court
will then be faced with the question of how far to carry the analogy in resolving particular disputes.

D. Martindale v. Anderson
The recent Utah Supreme Court case of Martindale v.
Andersonm is a dramatic departure from the traditional judicial
view of the relationship between executive and legislative functions in municipal government. The case carries the trend of increasing executive power to its ultimate conclusion, and illustrates both the theoretical and practical implications of the full37. Municipal Court v. Patrick, 254 So. 2d 193 (Fla. 1971). The court interpreted the
city charter to mean that all legislative power was vested in the city commission alone, a
limitation which applied "as well to municipalities as it does between the Congress and
the President on the national level." Id. a t 195. Since municipal power has traditionally
been centered in legislative bodies, this separation of powers language may serve only to
reduce executive power. It is clear the court intended to limit executive intrusion into
legislative functions ("History teaches us . . . the danger of vesting total power in a single
individual . . . ." Id.), but it is not as clear the court would have limited legislative
intrusion into executive functions. Id.
38. Broidrick v. Lindsay, 39 N.Y .2d 641,646, 350 N .E.2d 595, 598, 385 N .Y.S .2d 265,
267 (1976). The mayor had issued an executive order that each bidder on city construction
contracts would he required to submit a n affirmative action program to ensure against
discrimination in employment practices, and the deputy mayor had promulgated rules
pursuant to the order requiring contractors to meet prescribed percentages of minority
employment. The legislative policy prohibited discrimination but did not go so far as to
mandate an affirmative action percentage program. Id.
39. Jackson v. Inman, 232 Ga. 566, 569, 207 S.E.2d 475, 478 (1974). Compare this
language with that of the same court just three years earlier in Flanigen v. Preferred Dev.
Corp., 226 Ga. 267, 174 S.E.2d 425 (1970), in which the court had stated unequivocally
"ltlhe separation of powers doctrine does not apply to municipal governments." Id. a t
268, 174 S.E.2d a t 426. See Ford v. Mayor of Brunswick, 134 Ga. 820,68 S.E. 733 (1910).
40. 581 P.2d 1022 (Utah 1978).
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scale application of the separation of powers model to a municipal
setting.
1. Background of the case

The Utah Constitution provides that the state legislature
shall determine the organization of municipal governments but
also provides that cities may adopt home rule charters." The
governing power of all municipalities is derived entirely from the
Utah Legislatureu and has traditionally been lodged in a single
body exercising both executive and legislative
In 1959 the Utah Legislature passed the first major variation
from this traditional form of municipal government with the
Strong Mayor Form of Government Act," which authorized a
form of government expressly separating the powers of the board
of commissioners from those of the mayor.45That Act was unpopular because of technical flaws41and was repealed in 1975 by the
Optional Forms of Municipal qovernment Act," which itself was
repealed, amended, and recodified in substantially the same form
in 1977? The degree to which the 1975 Act and its 1977 amendments created a separation of municipal powers became the basis
of the dispute in Martindale v. Anderson.
In a 1975 referendum, the electorate of Logan, Utah, adopted
the optional council-mayor form authorized by the Optional
Forms of Municipal Government Act. When the new government
became effective, disputes arose concerning the division of executive and legislative powers under the new form. Particularly a t
issue were the powers asserted by the mayor to acquire and transfer property without council approval, to exercise exclusive control over the approval of plans for proposed subdivisions, to trans41. UTAHCONST.art. XI, $ 5.
42. Salt Lake City v. Sutter, 61 Utah 533, 216 P. 234 (1923).
43. This was either a board of commissioners, a city council, or a board of trustees,
depending on the classification of the municipality. UTAHCODEANN.$$ 10-6-1to -5 (1978)
(current version a t UTAHCODEANN. $4 10-3-101 to -104 (Supp. 1977)).
44. Ch. 20, 1959 Utah Laws 42 (repealed 1975).
45. UTAHCODEANN.$ 10-6-79 (1973) (repealed 1975). The option was available only
to first and second class cities, id. 4 10-6-76 (1973) (repealed 1975), which were those with
a population of a t least 60,000. Id. $ 10-1-1 (1973) (current version at UTAHCODEANN. 5
10-2-301 (Supp. 1977)).
46. R. Lee, Optional Forms of Local Government in Utah 3 (June 1976) (unpublished
report of the Utah Department of Community Affairs).
47. Ch. 33, 1975 Utah Laws 106 (current version a t UTAHCODEANN. $$ 10-3-1201to
-1228 (Supp. 1977)).This Act made the mayor-council and council-manager forms available to all municipalities regardless of their classification. Id.
48. UTAHCODEANN. $5 10-3-1201 t o -1228 (Supp. 1977).
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fer funds within departmental budgets, and to limit the council's
access to administrative information.
In March of 1977 three members of the five-member city
council brought an action for declaratory judgment against the
mayor.lg The trial court held that under the council-mayor form
all executive and legislative power resided in the council, which
was the city's governing body, with the mayor possessing only
those powers expressly vested in him by the Act. The mayor,
therefore, had no authority to exercise the powers he had
claimed.")
The Utah Supreme Court reversed, holding the Act provided
for a complete separation of executive and legislative powers in a
manner patterned after the federal and state constitution^.^' The
mayor was therefore justified in buying, selling, or exchanging
property and in exercising power to approve subdivision plans
without council approval.J2The supreme court affirmed the trial
court's rulings on the questions of budget transfers and council
access to administrative information, holding these powers to be
within the legislative sphere?
2.

The court's analysis

The Utah Supreme Court rejected the argument that under
the new form of government the council was the locus of all residuary power-that it possessed all governing powers except those
expressly vested in the mayor by the Act." Instead, the court
held, the Act provided for the "complete" or "absolute'' separation of executive and legislative powers between the mayor and
the council with municipal governing powers residing in both.J"
The court reasoned that the preface to the Act indicated a
legislative intent to provide for an alternative to traditional forms
of municipal governmentJ6along the same lines as the 1959 Strong
Mayor Form of Government Act?' Support for this conclusion
49. The city attorney and city budget officer were also named as defendants. However, the trial court later dismissed the complaint against them since, as agents of the
mayor, they would automatically be bound by any decision concerning mayoral authority.
Martindale v. Anderson, No. 16302 (Utah 1st Dist. Ct. Oct. 20, 1977), aff'd in part and
rco'd in part, 581 P.2d 1022 (Utah 1978).
50. Id.
51. Martindale v. Anderson, 581 P.2d 1022, 1024 (Utah 1978).
52. Id. a t 1027-28.
53. Id. at 1029.
54. Id. a t 1023-24.
55. Id. at 1024-27.
56. Id. a t 1025.
$ 4 10-6-76 to -102 (1973) (repealed 1975).
57. UTAHCODE-ANN.
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was found in various portions of the Act: first, the Act provided
that the council was to deal with the administrative affairs of the
municipality " 'solely through the chief executive,' "" who was
designated as the mayor; second, the council was "specifically
defined" as the legislative body; third, the mayor was excluded
from a seat on the council; and finally, the only legislative power
reserved to the mayor was a veto power that could be overridden
by a vote of two-thirds of the c o ~ n c i lThe
. ~ court rejected the trial
court's emphasis on a provision declaring the council to be the
"governing body," reasoning that a reading of the entire Act in
light of its legislative history and that of prior legislation in the
area revealed an intention to divide the governing power."
Because the action was for declaratory judgment, the court
also considered the prospective effect of the 1977 amendments to
the Act, even though they were not in force a t the time the action
was filed? These modifications deleted the provision which had
designated the council as the governing body, and declared that
municipal government would be vested in " 'two separate, independent, and equal branches of municipal government.' "62
The court then considered the specific Logan City disputes
in light of its general reasoning. The purchase, sale, exchange,
and management of city property were found to be executive
functions reserved exclusively to the mayor," as was the final
approval of city subdivisions when done in accordance with policies and procedures adopted by the municipal council.64These
powers are executive rather than legislative, the court reasoned,
because they are "policy execution powers" rather than "policy
making powers."65
Justice Crockett voiced a strong dissent. Since it is a basic
rule of statutory construction that powers not expressly delegated
are excluded, he argued, and since cities have only those powers
58. Martindale v. Anderson, 581 P.2d 1022, 1025 (Utah 1978) (emphasis in original)
(quoting Optional Forms of Municipal Government Act, ch. 33, 3 19, 1975 Utah Laws 106
(current version a t UTAHCODEANN. § 10-3-1217 (Supp. 1977))).
59. Id. a t 1025.
60. Id. a t 1027.
61. Id. a t 1026-27.
62. Id. a t 1026 (quoting UTAHCODEANN. 5 10-3-1209 (Supp. 1977)).
63. Id. a t 1027.
64. The court rejected the respondents' argument that three separate statutory provisions, UTAHCODEANN. § § 10-9-25, 17-21-8, 57-5-3 (1973) (requiring approval of subdivisions by the municipal "legislative" and "governing" body), applied. The intent of these
provisions, the court held, was only to require approval before recordation by the appropriate authority. Since they were passed long before the new optional form was contemplated, they were not controlling. 581 P.2d a t 1028.
65. 581 P.2d a t 1027 (emphasis in original).
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delegated to them by the state legislature, it follows that the
mayor had only those powers expressly granted to him and not
the additional powers he had claimedY The separation of powers
language in the 1977 amendments must be interpreted in view of
the historical development of the doctrine, he reasoned, which
reveals that all undelegated power in state government rests with
the legislative branch." Finally, Justice Crockett warned of the
danger of abuse inherent in such a "far-reaching" grant of power
to the mayor?
The supreme court unanimously upheld the trial court's
holding that a section of Utah's Uniform Municipal Fiscal Procedures Actmprohibited the mayor from transferring funds set aside
for the purchase of specifically described line items without council approval. This interpretation, the court held, was consistent
with the encumbrance system of that Act.70The supreme court
also affirmed the trial judge's ruling that the council was entitled
to access to all administrative records of the city pursuant to the
adoption of any reasonable procedure for obtaining them."

A. A New Theoretical Framework
The primary significance of Martindale v. Anderson is its
sweeping redefinition of the municipal power structure.72It recognized a form of municipal government in which executive powers
are conferred directly and exclusively on the mayor by the state
legislature rather than circuitously via the municipal council."
The impact of this theoretical framework is illustrated well by the
issue of subdivision approval in Martindale. The mayor actually
66. Id. a t 1030-31 (Crockett, J., dissenting).
67. Id. at 1030.
68. Id. at 1031.
69. UTAHCODEANN. §§ 10-10-23 to -75 (1973).
70. 581 P.2d at 1029.
71. Id.
72. Counsel for the appellant described the significance of the case as follows:
[Tlhe decision in this case . . . will have application far beyond Logan City,
because this is the first case to reach this court and perhaps any court of final
jurisdiction in this country defining powers and duties between the executive
and the legislative branches in a municipality that operates under a division of
powers system of government rather than under a council or commission having
joint legislative and executive authority.
Brief of Appellant at 33, Martindale v. Anderson, 581 P.2d 1022 (Utah 1978).
73. Other states which presently have statutes that might be similarly interpreted
ANN. $8 40:69A-31 to -48 (West 1967),and Ohio, OHIOREV.
include New Jersey, N.J. STAT.
CODEANN. § § 705.71-.86 (Page 1976).
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admitted the power of subdivision approval was vested in the
council by other statutes, but argued the council had delegated
the power to him by ~rdinance.~'
The court used an entirely different rationale, declaring subdivision approval to be an executive
function directly vested in the mayor and the delegation argument to be irrelevant since the council had no executive power
to delegate.75
1. Finding intent to create a separation of powers

The terms "governing body" and "governing authority" are
commonly used in statutes of various states to refer to local legislative b~dies,~"eflectingthe fact that these bodies have typically
possessed both legislative and executive authority. If such language is carried over into new statutes and charters, it will create
obstacles to judicial recognition of a municipal system in which
executive authority is granted directly and exclusively to the
mayor.
In Martindale, the Utah court was confronted with such a
situation. A provision of the Optional Forms of Municipal Government Act specifically designated the city council as the
"governing body,"77 and counsel for the respondents argued this
language preserved the traditional allocation of local powers in
the new form of g ~ v e r n m e n tThe
. ~ ~ court overcame the apparent
effect of this language by emphasizing another provision in the
Act that, in its view, specifically defined the city council as the
legislative body.79It also pointed to the 1977 amendments to the
Act, which deleted the priginal " governing body" language and
explicitly described " 'two separate, independent, and equal
branches of municipal government.' "80 Although the court stated
these amendments were being considered for their prospective
effect only, it relied heavily on them as evidence that the original
intent of the state legislature had been to vest the complete exec-

74. Brief of Appellant a t 26-27, Martindale v. Anderson, 581 P.2d 1022 (Utah 1978).
75. 581 P.2d at 1028.
76. E.g., CAL.GOV'TCODEEj 5402 (West 1966); IND.CODEANN. § 20-13-6-3 (Burns
STAT.ANN. art. 23(9) (Vernon 1969).
Supp. 1977);TEX.REV.CIV.
77. Ch. 33, Ej 11, 1975 Utah Laws 106 (current version a t UTAHCODEANN. Ji 10-3-1210
(Supp. 1977)).
78. Brief of Respondents a t 11-12, Martindale v. Anderson, 581 P.2d 1022 (Utah
1978).
79. 581 P.2d at 1025, 1027 (construing Optional Forms of Municipal Government Act,
ch. 33, Ej 2(2), 1975 Utah Laws 106 (repealed 1977)).
80. Id. at 1026 (quoting UTAHCODEANN. 8 10-3-1209 (Supp. 1977)).
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utive power in the mayor.R1Without similar manifestations of
intent, courts in other states would have more difficulty overcoming traditional language to reach the same conclusion.
2.

Selecting the appropriate separation of powers model

Federal and state separation of powers models may prove
helpful in analyzing a municipal separation of powers system.
However, in seeking guidance from these models courts should
not overlook differences in the theoretical underpinnings of the
state and federal governmentsg2and simply assume, as the Utah
court apparently did," that either model is equally appropriate.
There is a basic theoretical flaw in an analogy between the
separation of powers in municipal government and the separation
of powers in state government. As the Martindale dissent pointed
out, a state legislature derives its power directly from the people
and "the residuum of any undelegated power is reposed
therein."8-lIn most municipal governments, by contrast, no simithe
lar residuum of power rests with the local legi~lature.~Vn
81. See 581 P.2d at 1026-27. Further evidence that the state legislature had originally
intended to give a blanket grant of executive power to the mayor in the 1975 Act may be
found by making a comparison of the statutory language governing the separated powers
form with the council-manager option available under the Optional Forms of Municipal
Government Act. Under the council-manager form, the provision dealing with the powers
of the mayor expressly states that he shall have only those powers conferred upon him by
the Act. Optional Forms of Municipal Government Act, ch. 33, Q 25, 1975 Utah Laws 106
(current version at UTAHCODEANN. 4 10-3-1223(Supp. 1977)).By contrast, the provision
establishing the mayor's duties under the mayor-council form contains no such express
limitation.
There is language in the Optional Forms of Municipal Government Act that might
support a contrary conclusion, however. One provision of the Act grants the municipal
council in the council-mayor form the power to prescribe additional duties for the mayor.
Ch. 33, Q 21(9), 1975 Utah Laws 106 (current version at UTAHCODEANN. Q 10-3-1219(9)
(Supp. 1977)). It might be argued this provision indicates the state legislature intended
to leave a pool of executive power under the control of the council.
82. Wood v. Budge, 13Utah 2d 359, 3€!3,374 P.2d 516,518 (1962) (footnotesomitted):
[The State Legislature] is significantly different . . . from the federal government, which is a government of limited powers . . . expressly granted to it by
the states through the Federal Constitution; whereas, the State Legislature,
having the residuum of governmental power, does not look to the State Constitution for the grant of its powers, but that Constitution only sets forth the limitations on its authority.
83. 581 P.2d at 1024.
84. Id. at 1030 (Crockett, J., dissenting) (citing Trade Comm. v. Skaggs Drug Centers, Inc., 21 Utah 2d 431, 446 P.2d 958 (1968), and Wood v. Budge, 13 Utah 2d 359, 374
P.2d 516 (1962)). See, e.g., Opinion of the Justices, 276 A.2d 441, 444 (Me. 1971); In re
Elliott, 74 Wash. 2d 600, 604, 9 6 P.2d 347, 351 (1968).
85. E.g., Cobo v. O'Bryant, 116 So. 2d 233 (Fla. 1959). Some jurisdictions, on the
other hand, have recognized a limited right of local self-government. E.g., State v. Fox,
158 Ind. 126, 63 N.E. 19 (1902).
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municipal system described in Martindale, for example, neither
the council nor the mayor has any residual powers,nfithough each
does possess a broad statutory authorization to perform, respectively, any legislative or executive functions the state legislature
properly delegates to municipalities. In this respect, a better
analogy for theoretical purposes might be found in the structure
of the federal government since it is also a government of delegated powers."

B. Allocation of Specific Municipal Functions
A statute or charter creating a municipal separation of powers system probably would not exhaustively classify executive
and legislative functions, explicitly assigning each function to the
appropriate branch of city government. The court in Martindale
apparently assumed that a simple executive-legislative dichotomy provided sufficient guidance where there is no specific statutory allocation of functions." However, conflicting language in
preexisting statutes and the generality of the executive-legislative
distinction would pose problems both for courts and municipal
officers attempting to apply that formula.
I.

Inconsistent language in general municipal statutes

Apart from those statutes creating specific forms of municipal government, most states have general municipal statutes
which govern the operation of municipalities not operating under
their own charters. These statutes often contain language indicating that the power to perform particular municipal functions is
vested in the local legislative body? Since these statutes do not
contemplate the existence of forms of government with complete
separation of executive and legislative powers, this language may
not necessarily reflect an intent on the part of the state legislature
to classify particular functions as legislative rather than executive.
86. Utah adheres to the prevailing view that a municipality is only a creature of the
state and cannot, by its very nature, possess any residual governmental powers. Salt Lake
City v. Allred, 19 Utah 2d 254, 430 P.2d 371 (1971); Salt Lake City v. Sutter, 61 Utah
533, 216 P. 234 (1923).
87. This analogy would not be as appropriate, however, wheie an inherent right of
local self-government is recognized, see note 85 supra, or where a home rule charter creates
a greater degree of local autonomy. E.g. Lower Colo. River Auth. v. City of San Marcos,
523 S.W.2d 641 (Tex. 1975). In these situations an analogy to state government might be
more appropriate.
88. 581 P.2d at 1027-28.
89. E.g, C h . GOV'TCODE4 34091.1 (West 1968); OKLA.STAT.ANN. tit. 11, $4 1102(3), 22-112 (West 1978).
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In Utah, for example, various statutory provisions which confer the power to perform particular functions on municipalities
refer to the "board of commissioners, city council or . . . board
of trustee^,"^ the "governing body,"91the "legislative body,"92or
simply to "they."93 In light of Martindale, these designations confuse role definition since their literal application to the new
mayor-council form is inappropriate. Each particular provision
must now be scrutinized to determine whether the particular
function is inherently executive or legi~lative.~'
2.

Generality of the executive-legislative distinction

The distinction between executive and legislative matters is
too general to provide workable standards for categorizing specific municipal functions. The confusion which could result from
the use of this formula alone is illustrated by the fact that the
decision to rezone a specific piece of land is considered to be a
legislative function in California," a judicial function in Oregon,'
and an administrative function in Utah.97
In Martindale the court failed to deal with this danger and
simply assumed the policymaking versus policy-execution distinction was sufficiently definitive. It then characterized the
transfer of property and the approval of subdivisions as "clearly"
executive function^,^^ apparently ignoring the fact that the decision to purchase a particular tract of land or deny approval of a
large development might have major policymaking implications
90. UTAHCODEANN. 8 10-7-6 (1973) (power to make contracts for public lighting).
91. Id. 8 10-8-17 (power to control water distribution).
92. Id. 8 10-9-4 (power to appoint a planning commission).
93. Id. 8 10-8-14 (power to control utilities and public transportation).
94. The appellant suggested the following approach: "In short, where the general
municipal laws are consistent with the council-mayor form, they are to be literally applied. Where they are not consistent they are superseded and modified to the extent of
the incompatibility.'' Brief of Appellant at 14, Martindale v. Anderson, 581 P.2d 1022
(Utah 1978). Utah courts and municipal officers may also experience some difficulty in
interpreting future general municipal statutes in light of the Martindale holding. Any
attempt by the state legislature to confer an executive function by general statute on all
municipal legislative bodies, including the council in the council-mayor form, would require an explicit amendment to the Optional Forms of Municipal Government Act. Otherwise, the new legislation could lose its intended effect by being confused with statutes
passed prior to the Act which have no bearing on the distribution of powers in the councilmayor form.
95. Ensign Bickford Realty Corp. v. City Council, 68 Cal. App. 3d 467,137 Cal. Rptr.
304 (1977).
96. Fasano v. Board of County Comm'rs, 264 Or. 574, 507 P.2d 23 (1973).
97. Bird v. Sorenson, 16 Utah 2d 1, 394 P.2d 808 (1964).
98. 581 P.2d a t 1027-28.
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at a local level.gB
The Martindale approach, therefore, gives little guidance for
the resolution of future disputes. In the absence of language in a
statute or charter spelling out respective powers in careful detail,
the prospect of recurring adjudication threatens to disrupt the
operation of municipalities seeking to solidify the roles of the
mayor and council under governments with separated powers.
3. Possible sources of clarification

One possible solution to the problems of classification might
be to turn to federal or state models. While these models have
value in defining the general contours of power, they may not be
very useful in resolving particular disputes. Although municipal
and federal governments are similar in that both are governments
of delegated powers,Immany specific municipal functions have no
clear federal equivalent. On the other hand, while many of the
functions performed by municipal governments have a more obvious state equivalent, state and municipal separation of powers
structures are theoretically dissimilar. Io1
In Martindale the court apparently did not find the state and
federal models dispositive. Although it described the new form of
government as one "framed in the image of the federal and state
systems,"102it classified the disposition of public property as an
executive prerogative in spite of the fact that it is under the
ultimate control of the legislative branch a t the state and federal
levels. lo"
A better source for clarifying executive and legislative roles
might be found in the case law dealing with the referendum process. Because of the well-established general rule that only legislative action is subject to referendum, the courts have long dealt
with the executive-legislative distinction a t the municipal level
in that context.lo4This approach is consistent with the holding in
Martindale since the Utah court, as well as the courts of other
99. The court also overlooked the fact that the Act itself gives the council the power
to "hold executive sessions . . for the purpose of discussion of . . . land acquisition."
Optional Forms of Municipal Government Act, ch. 33, 8 13, 1975 Utah Laws 106 (current
versiqn at UTAHCODEANN.5 10-3-1212(Supp. 1977)).
100. See text accompanying notes 82-87 supra.
101. See notes 84-85 and accompanying text, supra.
102. 581 P.2d at 1024.
103. U.S. CONST.art. IVY8 3; UTAHCONST.art. XIX, 8 2; UTAHCONST.art. XX, $ 1 .
104. E.g., Kelly v. John, 162 Neb. 319, 75 N.W.2d 713 (1956); Keigley v. Bench, 97
Utah 69, 89 P.2d 480 (1939). See Note, The LegislativelAdministrative Dichotomy and
the Use of Initiative and Referendum in a North Dakota Home Rule City, 51 N.D.L. REV.
855 (1975).

.
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states, have held that actions concerning specific pieces of property are administrative in nature and not subject to the referendum process.Io5
One other possible source of clarification is the law arising
out of the commonly used discretionary function exception to the
waiver of governmental immunity.Io6The distinction between
planning (discretionary) and operational (nondiscretionary)
functions in the governmental immunity context resembles the
distinction between the policymaking and policy-execution functions described in Martindale. Io7 However, almost no governmental act is totally nondiscretionary,lo8and the discretionary function exception applies to many functions performed by the executive branch of government.10gTherefore, a direct application of
precedent from the governmental immunity setting to the separation of powers setting would be inappropriate. Nevertheless, case
law in that area considers similar issues in specific factual settings and may shed light on the problem of c l a s s i f i ~ a t i o n . ~ ~ ~

C. Checks on the Abuse of Executive Power
The exact parameters of the mayor's authority in a municipal government with separated powers are as yet undefined. Indeed, the Utah court's use of the terms "absolute" and
complete"^^ seems to have given the dissenting justice in
Martindale good reason to warn of the dangers of "wilful1 [sic]
arrogation of powers."112The court, however, overstated its point
105. E.g., State v. Salome, 167 Kan. 766, 208 P.2d 198 (1949); Monahan v. Funk, 137
Or. 580, 3 P.2d 778 (1931); Bird v. Sorenson, 16 Utah 2d 1, 394 P.2d 808 (1964).
106. In spite of the large-scale abrogation of governmental immunity, immunity is
often preserved if a basic policy decision (discretionary function) is involved. E.g., 28
U.S.C. § 2680(a) (1976); CAL.GOV'TCODE4 820.2 (West 1966);UTAHCODEANN. F) 63-30lO(1) (1978).
107. See generally Note, Separation of Powers and the Discretionary Function Exception: Political Question in Tort Litigation Against the Government, 56 IOWA
L. REV. 930,
950-52 (1971). The discretionary function exception was not created for the purpose of
maintaining a separation of executive and legislative functions. It does, however, reflect
the basic logic of the separation of powers in the sense that it represents a reluctance on
the part of the judicial branch to intervene in areas committed to other branches of
government. Id. a t 946, 959.
108. Id. at 952.
109. E.g., Dahelite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 37-42 (1953); Cobb v. Waddington,
154 N.J. Super. 11, 380 A.2d 1145 (1977).
110. Seegenerally Note, Separation of Powers and the Discretionary Function ExcepL. REV.930,
tion: Political Question in Tort Litigation Against the Government, 56 IOWA
954-69 (1970). Utah cases defining discretionary functions include Andrus v. State, 541
P.2d 1117 (Utah 1975), and Carroll v. State Rd. Comm., 27 Utah 2d 384, 496 P.2d 888
(1972).
111. 581 P.2d a t 1024.
112. Id. a t 1031 (Crockett, J., dissenting).
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in using such terms since the separation of powers doctrine has
never been interpreted to require that the branches of government be hermetically sealed off from each other.l13 A structural
analysis of this new form of municipal government reveals several
checks on executive power.
One major source of control may be found in the ultimate
budgetary authority traditionally considered to repose in the legislative branch. In Martindale, for example, the court construed
Utah's Uniform Municipal Fiscal Procedures Act114in such a
manner as to allow the city council tight budgetary control of the
mayor's expenditures. Under this ruling, the council has power to
prevent virtually all unapproved expenditures through the use of
specifically described line items.l15In spite of the court's holding
that the acquisition of land is an executive function, the council's
careful use of this budgetary power in the future could strictly
limit a mayor's ability to purchase land without its authorization.
This method of control will not provide any limitation on a
mayor's power to sell or exchange property, however.l16
A second source of control rests in the general power of a
legislative body to formulate rules and procedures for executive
action. By exercising its power to frame these rules with precision,
a city council can exercise a substantial degree of control over a
mayor. In Martindale, the court implicitly recognized the propriety of this technique when it discussed the action the city
council had taken in setting forth specific rules governing the
procedures for review and approval of planned unit, interblock,
and cluster developments.l17Consequently, in spite of the court's
holding that the ultimate power of subdivision approval is vested
in the mayor, carefully drafted procedural rules such as these
minimize any danger of mayoral abuse.
The Martindale court suggested a third possible limitation
on executive power when it held the city council was entitled to
--

113. See Buckley v. Valeo, 421 U.S. 1, 121 (1976); LaGuardia v. Smith, 288 N.Y.1,
8, 41 N.E.2d 153, 156 (1942) (Lehman, C.J., dissenting).
114. UTAHCODEANN. 8 § 10-10-23 to -75 (1973).
115. 581 P.2d a t 1029.
116. A Utah mayor is still subject to the rule prohibiting a city from disposing of
public property by gift without authority from the state legislature. Sears v. Ogden City,
533 P.2d 118 (Utah 1975).
117. 581 P.2d a t 1028. The propriety of this technique is further illustrated by the
fact that imprecise municipal regulations are sometimes held invalid on the theory that
they result in the improper delegation of executive power. E.g., City of South Euclid v.
Glazer, 43 Ohio Misc. 9, 332 N.E.2d 780 (1974) (ordinance invalid for failure to provide
sufficient guidance to mayor). Accord, Sonn v. Planning Comm., 172 Conn. 156,374 A.2d
159 (1976).
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reasonable access to all administrative records.11uThe language of
the opinion gives no indication that this access might be restricted by the doctrine of executive pri~ilege."~
The possibility
that all executive records might be available for legislative scrutiny may serve as another safeguard against executive abuse.
A fourth possible limitation on the mayor's exercise of power
will arise in a system characterized as having "complete" or
"absolute" separation of powerslmif courts turn to precedent from
the governmental immunity area for guidance in classifying particular functions as executive or legislative.121In doing so, courts
might be influenced by case law in that area which emphasizes
the planning nature of many acts commonly performed by executive officers.In As a result, courts may be more likely to see the
policymaking implications of those functions and determine that
those functions belong to the local legislative body rather than
the mayor.
Finally, other checks on executive power might be written
directly into the statute or charter creating this new form of government. For example, provisions might be drafted which would
allow for legislative veto and review of certain executive actions.
This approach is used in Utah's Optional Forms of Municipal
Government Act, which provides that the mayor's authority to
prescribe the duties of some municipal officers is subject to the
council's power to do the same by ordinance.Iz3In addition, provisions carefully enumerating the powers granted to each branch of
government might be included as a further protection against
abuse.
IV.

CONCLUSION

In response to the need for greater efficiency in municipal
administration, new forms of local government have emerged that
allow increased executive authority and autonomy. As a result,
the process of municipal administration has become less entangled with the process of municipal legislation, and the doctrine
118. 581 P.2d at 1029.
119. In this respect this form of municipal government appears to deviate from the
federal model. See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974);Lee, Executive Privilege.
Congressional Subpoena Power, a d Judicial Review: Three Branches, Three Powers, and
Some Relationships, 1978 B.Y.U.L. Rev. 231, 231 n.2.
120. Martindale v. Anderson, 581 P.2d at 1024.
121. See text accompanying notes 107-10, supra.
122. E.g., Dahelite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 37-42 (1953); Cobb v. Waddington,
154 N.J. Super. 11, 380 A.2d 1145 (1977).
123. UTAHCODEANN. 8 10-3-1219(7)(Supp. 1977).
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of separation of powers has become more relevant a t a local level.
The culmination of this trend is a form of government such as the
one recognized in Martindale v. Anderson, a government expressly patterned after a classic separation of powers model.
Since such a system represents a dramatic departure from
the traditional structure of local government, its adoption may
create difficulties in the allocation of municipal functions and the
prevention of mayoral abuse. Although Martindale leaves many
questions unanswered, it does suggest that solutions to these
problems are available and that the doctrine of separation of
powers may provide a workable alternative framework for structuring municipal government.

Bradley E. Morris

